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Abstract
Most European countries have legal institutions regarding gifts and
bequests that are more constraining than the United States.
The purpose of this paper is to see whether those institutional dif-
ferences generate diﬀerences in behavior. The paper focuses on the
comparison between the United States and France, and on a number
of speciﬁc issues: the relative importance of bequest in wealth ac-
cumulation, the compensatory role of gifts and bequests, the actual
way the estate is divided among heirs, and the relative importance of
alternative types of inheritance.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In Europe, like in the United States, inheritance is generally not a big issue
in the political debate, except when there are plans for reforming estate or
inheritance taxation. In the near past, one of the major themes of the United
States presidential campaign, as well as the Italian parliamentary campaign,
was whether or not to phase out what has been dubbed the ”death tax”.
G.W. Bush and S. Berlusconi, the proponents of such a drastic reform, both
won.
It was interesting to hear the same arguments on the legitimacy of death
taxation in both countries. The proponents for repealing it claim that it would
remove an unfair, immoral and ineﬃcient tax. According to them this tax
adds to the pain suﬀered by mourning families; it hurts people of equivalent
wealth diﬀerently depending on their acumen at tax avoision; it penalizes the
frugal who pass wealth on to their children; it reduces everybody’s incentive
to save and to invest. Supporters of the tax, by contrast, argue that it is
fairly based on the equal opportunity principle, that it is a small but eﬀective
counterweight to the concentration of wealth, and that it has few disincentive
eﬀects since it is only payable at death.
Can we say that the issue of inheritance: its economic eﬀects, its legiti-
macy and its tax treatment, are perceived the same way in diﬀerent countries?
As we indicate below, the legal institutions regulating gifts and bequests are
quite diﬀerent in the United States and in Italy. Can we assert that institu-
tions don’t aﬀect behavior, which would be surprising in the light of recent
developments in political economy?
The truth probably lies somewhere in between as this paper shows. Eu-
rope, or rather continental Europe – since the United Kingdom is closer
to the United States than to most European countries – has speciﬁc legal
institutions regarding inheritance that are quite diﬀerent from those in the
United States, and this may explain some limited divergence in behavior.
Our quantitative knowledge of inheritance is not very good. Comparisons
are not easy. This is why we mainly deal with France and whenever possible
with other Continental European countries to contrast and compare with
what is happening in the United States.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a taxon-
omy of legal institutions regulating gifts and bequests, and it also summarizes
the main types of bequests since we know that the economic eﬀects of private
intergenerational transfers depend on the motives governing them. Section 3
2deals with particular questions to which the United States and Europe might
give diﬀerent answers: the quantitative importance of bequests, the eﬀect of
bequests on inequality, the compensatory nature of gifts and bequests and
the way they are divided among heirs. A ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Institutions and motives
2.1 Legal institution and the legitimacy of inheritance
Political economy, a growing ﬁeld, deals with the eﬀect of institutions on
policy outcomes. There has been a lot of work done linking budgetary insti-
tutions and budget deﬁcits, ﬁscal federation and the size of the government,
electoral rules and ﬁscal policy, to take three well-known examples.1 In the
same vein, it would be interesting to study the link between the legal institu-
tion regulating bequests and the actual practice of gifts and estate transfers.
Legal institutions vary quite a lot across countries. To characterize the
institutional setting we are concerned with we focus on two dimensions: free-
d o mo fb e q u e s ta n dt a x a t i o no ft r a n s f e r s .T a b l e1 puts together these two
characteristics, and shows how countries such as the United States and the
United Kingdom can be contrasted with France and Germany.2
There are two main types of wealth transfer taxes at death. There is
the estate tax which is levied on the total estate of the donor regardless of
the quality and the quantity of donees. This is the tax in use both in the
United States and in the United Kingdom. There is also the inheritance tax
which is levied on the share received by the donee. Inheritance taxation
typically includes a variety of rate scales and thresholds that depend on the
relationship between donor and donee. Most European countries, with the
exception of the United Kingdom, have inheritance taxation. Either type of
tax generally provides special treatment for surviving spouses.
In general estate taxation gives one total freedom to bequeath one’s
wealth to anyone or anything. Disinheritance is possible but it requires an
explicit will. Inheritance taxation, on the other hand, often comes with the
obligation to bequeath one’s wealth to one’s children, if any, and with equal
sharing of most of the estate. There is some freedom to do as one wishes
with small fraction of the estate, but this fraction declines with the number
1Persson and Tabellini (2000).
2Masson and Pestieau (1995).
3of children. As the relation between donee and donor gets more distant, the
inheritance tax treatment becomes less and less generous.
Taxation
Freedom of bequest No Estate taxation Inheritance taxation
Absolute Canada US, UK
Restricted to Primogeniture
children (if any)
Restricted to children France, Germany
and equal sharing
Table 1: Legal institutions regulating wealth transfers
The relative merits of the estate-type and of the inheritance-type taxation
are clear. The ﬁrst is simple and easier to administer, leaving all discretion
to the donee to dispose of his wealth as he wishes. This means that it is
possible to compensate some children over others for diﬀerences in income or
needs. There is also the possibility of disinheriting one’s children.
By contrast, the inheritance tax is more equitable than the estate tax to
the extent that it lightens the tax load of large families. Yet, it does not allow
for compensatory treatment of children with uneven endowments.3
Basically, the estate taxation reﬂects a conception of the family and of
the state that is quite diﬀerent from the one behind the inheritance taxation.
If one trusts in the fairness of parents in disposing of their estate, and if one
believes that intrafamily inequality is as important as interfamily inequality,
then what is desirable are both freedom of bequest and a very low estate
tax. On the other hand if one does not trust parents to make compensatory
transfers within the family, and there are huge diﬀerences of wealth across
families, then high inheritance taxation with mandatory equal sharing seems
to be the best solution.4
The regulation of estate division can have surprising implications. It has
been shown that in agricultural France equal sharing has induced families
3In Cremer and Pestieau (1988) it is also argued that tax rates decreasing with the
degree of consanguinity can be redistributive.
4See on this Cremer and Pestieau (2001).
4to have fewer children than total freedom of bequeathing. Traditionnally,
in such an environment the objective of parents has been to keep the estate
undivided. This was possible with primogeniture but not with equal sharing.
Thus, the only choice left was to have one or at most two children.5 In the
English Middle Ages, the frequency of remarriages, along with the existing
values, led to the mistreatment of stepchildren by stepparents. To avoid dis-
inheritance, equal division was imposed. When both the demographic and
the societal evolution made such situations less likely, England moved back
towards unrestricted bequeathing. By contrast, most of Continental Europe
maintained restrictive equal-sharing.6 Why such a contrasting evolution? An-
swer to that question is clearly outside the realm of this paper.
2.2 Transfer motives and implications
To understand the importance and the role of gifts and estate transfers one
needs to have a better grasp of the donor’s motives if any. Consider two
examples concerning gifts and bequests. First, suppose that we observe gifts,
but we don’t know whether they are true gifts due to altruism or really involve
some sort of exchange (the donee providing services to the donor). It is clear
that a number of eﬀects would diﬀer under the two cases. Second, consider
some bequests but we are uncertain whether they are left accidentally because
of the incompleteness of annuity markets or intentionally for some type of
altruism. Again, depending on the case, the eﬀects of bequests on income
inequality, capital accumulation, education could be quite diﬀerent.
We examine brieﬂy a number of bequest motives that have been oﬀered
in the literature and sketch their implications focusing on those that are
testable and that can separate the United States and Europe.7
- Pure dynastic altruism. Altruistic bequest.
Parents care about the likely lifetime utility of their children, and hence
about the welfare of future generations. Accordingly, wealthier parents make
larger bequests and holding parent’s wealth constant children with higher
labor earnings will receive smaller bequests. There is also a tendency for par-
ents to leave diﬀerent amounts to diﬀerent children in order to equalize their
5Rosenthal (1991).
6Brenner (1985).
7This is developed in Masson and Pestieau (1997).
5incomes. Finally, pure altruism leads to the Ricardian equivalence: parents
compensate any intergenerational redistribution by the government through
matching bequests.
- Joy of giving. Paternalistic bequest (also called bequest-as-last-
consumption).
Parents here are motivated not by altruism but by the direct utility they
receive from the act of giving. This phenomenon, also referred to as ”warm
glow” giving, can be explained by a virtuous feeling connected with sacriﬁce,
a need to help one’s children, or control their lives. Formally these bequests
appear in the utility function as a consumption expenditure incurred in the
last period of life. Ceteris paribus, they are subject to income and price
eﬀects, but don’t have any compensatory eﬀect.
- Exchange-related motives. Strategic bequests.
In their canonical form, exchange-related models show children choosing
a level of ”attention” toward their parents in exchange for the prospect of
a potential bequest. Such exchanges can involve all sorts of non pecuniary
services and can be part of a strategic game between parents and children.
Strategic bequests, as originally presented, imply that parents extract all the
surplus from their children by playing them against each other. Strategic or
exchange bequests depend on the wealth and the needs of the donor; they
are not compensatory and they don’t need to be equal.
- No motive. Accidental bequests.
Up to this point bequests are planned. Whatever their motive they are
voluntary. We now consider unplanned or accidental bequests that result from
a traditional life-cycle model. Accordingly people in the main save during
their working lives in order to ﬁnance consumption when retired. Bequests
only occur because wealth is held in bequeatable form due to imperfections in
annuity markets or the need for precautionary savings. The main implication
of this form of bequest is that even a 100% estate tax rate should have no
disincentive eﬀect on the amount of bequest.
Table 2 gives an overview of some of the implications of wealth transfers
for each of these four types of motives.
6Types of bequests




parents and neutral equalizing neutral neutral
children
Disparity among neutral equalizing neutral neutral
siblings
Equal estate division yes no yes no
by default by default
Eﬀect on social uncertain positive moderate weak and
inequality but positive uncertain
Eﬀect of ﬁscal
policy
Public debt positive neutral positive positive
on consumption
Inheritance nil negative negative negative
taxation on saving or nil
Table 2: Implications of bequests motives
3E c o n o m i c e ﬀects of wealth transfers8
3.1 Quantitative importance of bequests in wealth ac-
cumulation
This issue has raised a hot debate between Kotlikoﬀ (1988) and Modigliani
(1988), the former claiming that the share of inherited wealth in the United
States is close to 80%, the latter estimating it as being below 20% (it would
be nil if there was only saving for retirement). How to account for such a huge
8Some parts of this section are further developed in Arrondel et al. (1997).
7discrepancy, which shows that empirical measures are also ”theory laden”?
Indeed the two authors agree neither on the relevant unit of decision and the
deﬁnition of a transfer, nor on the way to evaluate the actual contribution to
wealth accumulation of a transfer received in the past (Kessler and Masson,
1989; Kessler et al., 1991).
On the ﬁrst point, Modigliani considers only inheritance and major gifts
(i.e. that ”add to children’s wealth, not to consumption”) between indepen-
dent households. Kotlikoﬀ wants to add all transfers received above 18 years
of age (”adulthood”), including notably college education fees, which means
t w i c ea sm a n yt r a n s f e r s . G i v e nt h ec o n v e n t i o n a ld e ﬁnition of bequest, we
have to side with Modigliani, while allowing for the fact that his evaluation
may be somewhat underestimated.
On the second point, Modigliani wants to impute to the contribution of
bequests to total saving only the sum in real terms of received transfers.
Kotlikoﬀ wants to add to this the accumulated interest on transfers – once
again doubling the ﬁgures (hence the discrepancy in the results is on the
order of one to four). Who is right? Apparently no one since each convention
relies on an arbitrary, accounting decomposition of wealth in inherited and
self-accumulated shares (Blinder, 1988).
With such a range of estimates, comparison is not easy. Studies for other
countries indicate a greater share of inherited wealth. Davies and St-Hilaire
(1987) apply an accounting approach to Canadian data. They ﬁnd a 35%
share for inherited wealth without capitalizing and a 53% share when inher-
itances are capitalized. Laitner and Ohlsson (1977) ﬁnd that the inherited
wealth of households as a fraction of their total wealth in Sweden was 51%
in 1981. Using similar data and computations for the United States, they
estimate that share at 19% in 1984.
Kessler and Masson (1989) measure the decrease in total saving that
would follow a uniform reduction in bequests. Estimates derived with this
approach are comprised between 40% and 35% for France, and lower for the
United States.
The contribution of bequest to capital accumulation appears therefore
more important in these two European countries than in the United States,
and quite substantially so. Faster growing and predominantly private economies
such as the United States relative to France and Sweden seem to have a higher
share of aggregate wealth associated with lifetime accumulation.
83.2 The importance of gifts relative to bequests
T h ei m p o r t a n c eo finter vivos gifts is a very controversial issue in the United
States. So much so that the diﬀerences in deﬁnition are insuﬃcient to account
for the conﬂicting conclusions.
In various papers, Tomes states that gifts about which he has no infor-
mation will not invalidate his results as they are probably only of minor
importance, with the only possible exception being those of the wealthiest
individuals. Bernheim et al. (1985) see ”the apparent insigniﬁcance of gifts”
as an element supporting their model of strategic bequest. On the other
hand, Kurz (1984), Cox (1987, 1990), and Cox and Raines (1985) claim that
an enlarged conception of inter vivos transfers, including in kind or in cash
transfers received by an adult child (over 18) even in the same household,
make them more important than inheritance (in a ratio of 3 to 2). More
surprisingly, Gale and Scholz (1994), considering only inter-household trans-
fers worth more than $3,000, ﬁnd that inter vivos transfers ”account for at
least 20 percent of United States wealth and possibly more” (p. 156), and
inheritances roughly 30%.
In France, estate duty statistics indicate that the total amount of declared
inter vivos transfers represent each year approximately one third of the total
amount of declared inheritances (or one quarter of total transfers). However
this evaluation is incomplete since small inheritances, as well as many gifts
(especially those handed over directly), and various parental aids (sometimes
important) are not declared.
In any case, it is clear that in France the rate of diﬀusion of gifts, and
their relative importance with respect to inheritance, have increased over the
last 40 years. Reasons for the long-term development of gifts other than the
increase of average households wealth may include the rise in life expectancy
and the lengthened period where generations (parents and adult children)
overlap, and perhaps also the development of social security. However over the
short run, the frequency of gifts appears quite sensitive to changes in taxation:
their number was greatest in 1981, before the introduction of the wealth tax,
declined afterwards until 1986, and rose again with the restablishment of tax
advantages on gifts relative to inheritance (Laferrère, 1991).
Gifts in France seem to be an upper class phenomenon. Among the people
who died in 1987, less that 10% had made gifts. But the corresponding
proportion is more than half among the top 1% of the bequest distribution;
moreover, this privileged group accounts for 19% of total bequests, but for
9more than 54% of the total amount of gifts (Arrondel and Laferrère, 1994).
Gifts appear also more frequently among farmers and wealthy self-employed
people who bequeath their professional assets, as well as among widow(er)s.
A great number of these gifts are of small value, especially landed property.
They are less frequent among wage-earners, especially blue-collar workers,
w h e r et h e yc o r r e s p o n dm a i n l yt oa na n t i c i p a t i o no fi n h e r i t a n c e .
3.3 The compensatory nature of inter vivos transfers
Are inter vivos transfers, considered in isolation, dependent upon the eco-
nomic situation of the recipient, i.e. the size of his income, or the fact that
he may be liquidity-constrained? The answer must be twofold: it concerns
the probability of a transfer and its amount.
For the United States Cox (1990) and Cox and Jappelli (1990) claim
that transfers between parents and adult children (i.e. loans and gifts) are
meant for consumers who are liquidity-constrained, insofar as their perma-
nent income (and therefore their consumption needs) exceeds their current
resources (income or assets). They ﬁnd that, for a given permanent income
of the child, the probability of receiving a transfer decreases both with cur-
rent income and with the ratio of ﬁnancial assets to income. On the other
hand, these variables have no signiﬁcant (statistical) eﬀect on the amount of
the transfer received.
However, the picture is diﬀerent when one does not control for the child’s
permanent income. Cox (1987), and especially Cox and Rank (1992) conclude
that the transfer decision is compensatory, the probability of receiving a
transfer declining, other things being equal, with the recipient’s income. But
the transfer amount is anti-compensatory, increasing with the child’s current
income. McGarry and Schoeni (1994) ﬁnd that inter vivos transfers are
greater when given to less well-oﬀ children.
Finally Hochguertel and Ohlsson (2000) estimate probit and Tobit using
United States family panel data on gifts. They ﬁnd that gifts are compen-
satory in the sense that a child is more likely to receive a gift if he works
fewer hours and has lower income than her brothers and sisters. These results
carry over to the amounts given.
There is only one French study, Arrondel and Masson (1991), which tack-
les this issue. It reaches similar results: the frequency of gifts is compensatory,
but the amount bestowed is anti-compensatory. Such conclusions could be
more in favor of exchange-motivated than altruistic models of transfers (see
10Altonji et al., 1996 for further qualiﬁcations).
This French study is apparently the only one to consider the relation be-
tween diﬀerent forms of transfers, whether bestowed or received. The results
are striking. Parents who have helped their children are more likely to make
a gift later on, and to leave a signiﬁcant bequest at death. Also, the prob-
ability of ﬁnancially helping children is higher for donors. Finally, repeated
assistance or gifts over lifetime are quite common. Likewise, already helped
children are more likely to receive a gift or to beneﬁt from another form of
assistance, and donees are more likely to be helped out or to receive a second
gift. Indeed, the probability of receiving a inheritance is higher for donees
and heirs. Yet, this complementarity does not extend to amounts: for in-
stance, the amount of gifts bestowed (received) is not signiﬁcantly higher for
helpers (helped out children).
In other words, the same subpopulation of French families appears to
monopolize private intergenerational transfers whether received or bestowed,
thus combining the diﬀerent forms of transfers and multiplying them.
3.4 The relation between the number of children and
the size of bequests
Few studies deal speciﬁcally with the eﬀect of the very existence of children.
Using United States panel data, Hurd (1987) has found that on average
couples with independent children dissave during retirement proportionally
more than childless couples, other things being equal (including the amount
of wealth annuities at retirement). Yet, this striking conclusion favoring
accidental bequests is not really valid for two reasons: ﬁrst, couples with-
out children may continue to save for precautionary reasons against major
catastrophes (illness, invalidity), while in other families children may provide
a ”safety net”. Second, altruistic parents could decumulate more rapidly
during their retirement period because they make (partly unobserved) in-
ter vivos transfers to their liquidity-constrained children rather than passing
their wealth to them only at death (see Bernheim, 1991).
On the basis of French estate data Arrondel and Laferrère (1994) have
focused on the speciﬁcb e h a v i o ro ft h erich (the top 1%o rs o ) ,w h oa r e
mainly (formerly or actually) self-employed, own most of stock, and make
many more gifts and wills than others. The idea is that ”the very wealthy
(...) may not have an operable bequest motive (...) because they already
11consume as much as they want to or can); (...) thus changing the concern
they have for the welfare of their heirs will not change their consumption
behavior or wealth holdings”. (Hurd, 1990, p. 621). In other words, very
wealthy people make capitalist bequests. The empirical analysis corroborates
this: below the top 1% ,t h es i z eo fb e q u e s t si slower for childless couples and
increases with children’s income (anti-compensation); but among the richest
per centile, the size of bequests no longer depends on the presence of children,
nor on their income.
On the other hand, the relation between bequest left and the number of
children is not clear, neither in the United States nor in France. The only
exception is the Bernheim et al. (1985) study, which ﬁnds that bequests
are much more important and sensitive to the level of children’s attention
when there are at least two children. In any case, most American studies
(Adams, 1980; Tomes, 1981; Wilhem, 1996) as well as French ones (Arrondel
and Laferrère, 1991; Arrondel and Masson, 1991) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative
correlation between the amount of inheritance or transfers received by a child
and the number of siblings, which is often interpreted as the consequence of
the quantity-quality trade-oﬀ in the ”demand” for children.
Blomquist (1979) estimates Tobit models for inherited amounts using
Swedish micro data. He ﬁnds that the number of siblings has a signiﬁcantly
negative impact on the inherited amount. Laitner and Ohlsson (2001)a l s o
estimate Tobit models for inherited amounts using Swedish micro data. The
ﬁndings are the same: signiﬁcantly negative impacts of the number of siblings
on inherited amounts. They also get the same result using United States
micro data. Finally Alessie et al. (1995) obtain more or less the same result
for the Netherlands.
3.5 Equal or unequal shares: does bequest division
compensate for children’s unequal incomes?
Bequeathing patterns play an important role in shaping wealth distribution
– at least if the contribution of bequest to wealth accumulation is substan-
tial. Their analysis allows an assessment of the speciﬁc role of legislation
on individual behavior comparing the French and American situations. In
France people are forced by law to share their estate equally among their
children, and only a limited part of it (called ”quotité disponible”) can they
allocate freely by writing a will. In the United States equal sharing is the
12rule in intestate cases, but people are free to divide their estate as they wish
by making a will; moreover, estate taxation is unvariant to the way estate is
divided.
The ﬁrst diﬀerence between the two countries. In the United States the
proportion of testate cases is two thirds, while it is less than 10% in France,
although the proportion increases dramatically for the richest people and for
the childless deceased.
Let us consider the United States testate cases. Tomes (1981, 1988),
whose work is based on heirs’ declarations, concludes that exact equality
is in less than half. Other authors, who conﬁne themselves to information
contained in probate records, ﬁnd a much greater incidence of equal sharing.
In families with two children, for example, exact equality is observed in ap-
proximatively 70% of the cases (63% in Menchik, 1980a; 87% in Joulfaian,
1993) versus only 22% in Tomes. Moreover, primogeniture represents less
than 10% of the cases, and the frequency of equal sharing is higher among
wealthy households. Finally, the transmission of an indivisible professional
asset often leads to unequal sharing only if there is no other wealth to com-
pensate children deprived of the professional bequest.
Thus there is hardly any doubt that equal sharing is the most frequent
oﬃcial practice in the United States. It remains to be seen whether subjective
responses of heirs are truly biased, or if they reﬂect the fact that parents use
unoﬃcial means (assistance and undeclared gifts) to favor a particular child...
In France less than 8% of the estates are unequally divided (Arrondel
and Laferrère, 1992). These cases concern mainly the rich (contrary to the
United States situation) and the self-employed with several children and a
non liquid or indivisible bequest (professional assets, real estate). Moreover,
inheritance shares remain generally equal, the redistribution between siblings
being achieved mainly through previous gifts (80% of the cases).
There remains the question whether unequal shares compensate the less
privileged child. There is some evidence in the United States that girls, as-
sumed to receive less education or to care more for parents, are slightly
advantaged, Menchik (1980a) and Wilhem (1996) do not ﬁnd any signiﬁ-
cant correlation between children’s observable characteristics and the relative
amount of inheritance received. This ambiguous conclusion is also found for
France by Arrondel and Laferrère (1992). Indeed, the French or American
studies (apart from Tomes’) can explain why unequal estate division occurs,
but not the rationale underlying the observed distribution.
133.6 The importance of altruistic bequests in total be-
quests
Empirical studies of bequest use additional information concerning the com-
position of wealth, opinion or intention variables, or the inﬂuence of the level
of parental education.
The composition of bequest or bequeathable wealth should provide some
information as to the cause or motive of the transmission. But clearcut cases
– e.g. an estate consisting mainly of life annuities (accidental bequest),
a widower declaring an important life insurance (altruistic model), a large
fortune composed primarily of stocks and shares and other high-yield assets
(capitalistic bequest) – are quite rare. Moreover, the nature of the asset must
be precisely determined to be of any value: for instance, the beneﬁciary of a
life insurance should be known.
It is thus not surprising that very few studies use information on the
nature of assets held in order to test inheritance models. On the basis of
United States panel data, Bernheim (1991)d o e sﬁnd that higher social se-
curity beneﬁts tend to be associated with a higher level of life insurance
purchases. Moreover, the purchase of life insurance is more frequent among
older couples with independent children, and especially so when children are
worse oﬀ than the parents. Clearly, these results are evidence of the presence
of altruistic compensatory motives for bequest.
The simplest and most direct way of determining whether future bequests
correspond to a genuine transmission motive is to question households about
their intentions or opinions on this matter. Economists are often reluctant to
use such subjective information in their analyse. Yet, such variables appear
in several American studies (Menchik et al., 1986; McGarry, 1996), as well
as in some French ones.
Several lessons can be drawn. First, in the absence of an in-depth psy-
chological interview, it is essential, at the very least, that this information
is obtained in a favorable context, when people are actually faced with the
question. This is one reason explaining that intentions work better than
opinions. Also, asking a person, in the abstract, for his general opinion on
transmission isnot likely to lead to anything not worthy; as amply shown by
the econometric in signiﬁcance of the regression in the Menchik et al. (1986)
American study. On the other hand, asking a retired person, who has just
been questioned on her diﬀerent assets, as to how she intends to dispose of
his estate will undoubtedly provide more satisfactory results, as seen in the
14French wealth surveys Insee 1986 and 1992 (Perelman and Pestieau, 1991;
Arrondel and Perelman, 1994).
Second, opinions and intentions give more signiﬁc a n tr e s u l t sw h e nu s e da s
explanatory variables rather than as dependent ones, although the ”bequest
intent” in French surveys can be quite successfully explained by household
characteristics: wealth, income, self-employed status, and especially inheri-
tance received.
Third, the bequest intent is found in France to increase the amount of
bequeathable wealth, the level of portfolio diversiﬁcation and the probability
to own homes and hold other non liquid or indivisible assets. But opinions
in French surveys, used as explanatory variables, can also have signiﬁcant
eﬀects on the amount of wealth, especially those referring to ”retrospective”
behavior: ”Would it upset you to leave your kids a lesser amount of wealth
than you received from your parents?”.
If human and non-human transfers are substitutable, the level of parental
education should, other things being equal (notably the level of parental
resources), reduce the amount of bequests, because more educated parents
a r em o r ee ﬃcient at producing learning or earning skills in their children.
For the United States, Tomes (1981) obtains a speciﬁcn e g a t i v ee ﬀect
regarding parents’ education on the inheritance received by the child. Tomes
(1982) shows speciﬁcally that the overall amount of the estate and of inter-
generational savings are negatively correlated, at given parental resources,
with the father or mother’s education. But these results, which lend support
t ot h ea l t r u i s t i cm o d e l ,h a v eb e e no b t a i n e do n l yb ym e m b e r so ft h eC h i c a g o
(Beckerian) school.
For France Arrondel and Masson (1991) get mixed or opposite results:
a higher level of parental education increases the amount of gifts bestowed;
on the other hand, it has an ambiguous eﬀect on the size of bequeathable
wealth, depending on econometric speciﬁcation and population selection.
Finally, let us mention a recent comparison Japan-United States by Ho-
rioka et al. (2001). They ﬁnd that altruistic motives are weak in Japan both
absolutely and relative to the United States. On the basis of micro data they
show that Japanese bequests can mainly be explained by lifetime uncertainty
and by exchange considerations during old age.
153.7 Diﬀerences in wealth distribution
Wealth distribution ﬁgures for the United States and continental Europe in-
evitably prompt questions about the causes of the observed diﬀerences, and
particularly the role of inheritance and of estate taxation. Table 3 summa-
rizes the most recent data on wealth concentration obtained from surveys
and estate multiplier estimates. The broad conclusion is that wealth con-
c e n t r a t i o ni sl o w e ri nC o n t i n e n t a lE u r o p et h a ni nB r i t a i na n di nt h eU n i t e d
States. In all these countries one has observed a pronounced downward trend
in inequality since 1920 with an upturn in the United States since the 1970’s.
Focusing on the comparison between the United States and France, Kessler
and Wolﬀ (1991) account for the lower concentration of wealth in France
compared to the United States, partly in terms of the lesser importance of
corporate share ownership in France due to the greater share of productive
capital in the hands of the public sector.
F o rt h ed o w n w a r dt r e n di nw e a l t hc o n c e n t r a t i o no b s e r v e do v e rt h ep a s t
century, the fact that most of the reduction in inequality comes from the
falling share of the top 1% suggests that estate and inheritance taxes are
inﬂuential. This is quite interesting as the eﬀect of inheritance on wealth and
income inequality, and that of death taxation on the same variables, is not
as clear-cut a question as it appears in political debates.
Surveys Estate multipliers
USA (1983) 33 (1981)3 0




Ireland (1987) 10( 1966) 30
Sweden (1985) 11
UK (1993) 17
Source: Davies and Shorrocks (2000)
Table 3: Percentage of wealth share of top 1 percent of houselholds
16Interestingly, Piketty (2000) for France and Piketty and Saez (2001)f o r
the United States have attributed the downward trend to a number of large
shocks from which large fortunes never fully recovered because of steep pro-
gressive taxation (income more than wealth transfer taxation).
3.8 Estate versus inheritance tax
Wealth transfer taxation is quite diﬀe r e n ti nt h eU n i t e dS t a t e sa n di nC o n -
tinental Europe. Besides the diﬀerence analyzed above between estate and
inheritance taxation, estate taxation in the United States is known to concern
only the very wealthy households. Roughly speaking the deductible, that is
the amount below which there is no taxation, is 10 times higher in the United
States than in France (50 times than in Belgium).
Yet regardless of the type of wealth transfer taxation, the yield is uni-
formly poor. Table 4 provides the relative yield of wealth of taxation for a
sample of OECD countries.
From this table, it is clear that such taxes are not successful if their
primary objective has been to reduce reliance on other taxes.
Table 5 provides some information on the structure of inheritance taxation
in a number of EU countries. There is some variation from country to country
in tax rates applied when wealth is transmitted to children or to strangers
”in blood”. There are also diﬀerences in the level of exemption as well as in
the treatment of gifts.
For obvious reasons, the tax treatment of transfers to charitable organi-
zations is quite more generous with an estate than with an inheritance tax.
Italy and Ireland are the two countries where wealth transfers to charities are
fully tax exempted. In the other countries with inheritance taxation there
are at best preferential measures.
It would seem that in the balance between avoidance and evasion, Amer-
icans favor the ﬁrst and Europeans the second. This contrast raises an in-
teresting question. Given that the death tax yield is the same in the US and
Europe, is it better to elude its burden by giving away money to foundations,
or to invest it in tax heavens such as Luxembourg or Switzerland?
Just as an illustration, Kessler and Pestieau (1991)e s t i m a t et h a tt h e
eﬀective inheritance and gifts tax rate are equal to 6.25 % in France, whereas
standard statutory tax rates are around 40%.
17Table 4 indicates that the yield of the wealth transfer taxation hardly
exceeds 1% of total revenue. The range is impressive. It is noteworthy that
Italy only collects 0.16%, which means that abandoning the death taxation
there would have little consequence, unlike the United States where the yield
is 1.12%. Over time the evolution is not uniform, as Figures 1 and 2 indicate.
They show stability in Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom
after a drastic decline in the early 70’ for the latter. France has seen a slight
increase with the arrival of the left in 1981.
United States 1.12% Spain 0.57%
France 1.08% United Kingdom 0.56%
Belgium 0.75% Germany 0.30%
Netherlands 0.67% Italy 0.16%
Source: OECD (1999) Revenue statistics of OECD Member countries, Paris, OECD.
Table 4: Share of gift and estate taxation in total revenue


















Germany France United Kingdom USA
Figure 1



























Exemption First rate Minimax
(2)
Top tax strangers Rates years
(Euros)
(3)
of tax (%) (Euros)
(3)
rate in blood Higher/ included
Country lower
Belgium 12,400 3 495,600 30 30-80 same 3
France 72,200 5 1,707,500 40 60 same lifetime
(45,800)
Germany 306,800 7 25,565,000 30 17-50 same 10
(204,100)
(4)











Table 5: Wealth transfer taxation. Tax rate and exemption
19(1) Amounts in brackets are the allowances for children where they diﬀer from
the spousal allowance.
(2) Minimum taxable amount at which the maximum rate applies.
(3) Converted using exchange rates as of July 1,2 0 0 1.
(4) Special maintenance allowances are available to spouses and children under
18.
(5) Gifts from parents to children are exempt to EURO 7,700 over two years,
and once in a child’s lifetime may give EURO 19,000 if the child is between 18a n d
35.
(6) Dependents under 18 are exempt. Those over 18 are treated the same as
the spouse.
(7) If a child is under 13 the allowance is EURO 47,800, and for those over 13
it is EURO 15,900 plus EURO 4,000 for each year
(8) Disabled heirs or donees may receive an additional amount from EUR 47,800
to EURO 149,900 depending on the disability.
(9) Eﬀective rates are higher because there is no basic deduction.
4C o n c l u s i o n
W h a tc a nw ec o n c l u d ef r o mt h i ss u r v e y ?T h e r ea r ev e r yl i t t l ep r e c i s eﬁndings,
which is not surprising. Even in the United States where the academic debate
over the motives and the implications of inheritance is more intense than
anywhere else, most questions are still widely open.
By comparison European countries lack data, which make it impossible
to test theoretical hypotheses. It is interesting to note that in many in-
stances European economists who study the issues of inheritance use United
States data. When they don’t, they are very much inﬂuenced by the dom-
inant paradigm, and their main concern is to show that their own country
behaves like the United States. Finally, as the French case shows, research
is often restricted to a limited number of closely connected people and this
cannot lead to controversy. One can hope that, with the development of
research networks supported by the European Commission, there will be in
the near future a substantial eﬀort to develop data bases that are complete
and comparative.
Despite all these problems we can assert a few things.
Voluntary bequests seem to play a slightly more important role in Europe
than in the United States, which is not surprising. The role of the family
20in Europe is still very important in a number of areas. Moreover lifecycle
accumulation relative to wealth transmission is lagging.
Having said that there is wide consensus that such a thing as a Ricardian
equivalence based on pure altruistic transfers exist neither in Europe nor in
the United States.
Regardless of the legal setting, one observes equal sharing and poor yield
of wealth transfer taxation everywhere.
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